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Abstract
We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which govern-
ments also use public infrastructural investment to attract foreign direct
investment, thus enhancing their tax bases. In doing so, we allow for inter-
regional infrastructural externalities. Depending on the externality, gov-
ernments are shown to strategically over- or under-invest in infrastructure.
We examine how tax cooperation inuences investment in infrastructure
and nd that welfare may be lower under tax cooperation than under tax
competition; this is, in fact, the case when infrastructure is su¢ ciently
e¤ective in raising the tax base and generates a su¢ ciently large negative
interregional externality.
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1 Introduction
As economic globalisation deepens, countries tend to compete ercely with each
other to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Often countries use favourable
tax rates to compete for multinational investment. This is not only suggested by
the vast literature on tax competition but also emphasised by the often heated
political debate on corporate taxes.1 While the tax rate in the prospective
host location matters for a rms location decision, its actual location choice
typically hinges on a combination of host location characteristics that best suits
the specic needs of that rm.2 Hence, any government policy that helps to
create a more protable environment for multinational rms, such as investment
in local public infrastructure, potentially attracts mobile capital into a region.
Following the literature, we will interpret investment in public infrastructure
widely as any government investment that increases locally producing rms
productivity.3
This paper focuses on two questions. First, we examine how governments
investment decisions in public infrastructure interact with their policy of cor-
porate taxation. Second, we explore how tax harmonisation between two com-
peting host countries a¤ects those countriesinvestment in public infrastructure
and their welfare. The possibility of tax harmonisation has been on the polit-
ical agenda for a long time now and seems even more pressing as globalisation
deepens and discussions on this matter between the major trading blocks and
even within trading blocks (for instance, among EU member states) seem to
re-occur with increased frequency.
In addressing these issues, we explicitly model some of the innate character-
istics of public infrastructure investment. Investment in public infrastructure is
typically a medium-run or even long-run decision, implying that it is  at least to
a large extent  irreversible. In addition, because of its public good character,
public infrastructure investment may a¤ect the attractiveness of neighbouring
host countries as a result of potential interregional or international spillover
e¤ects.
Indeed, there is a good deal of evidence that such interregional spillovers
exist. However, the nature of the spillovers and in particular whether they are
benecial or harmful to neighbouring regions, seems to depend on the specic
regions involved as well as on the type of public infrastructure. For instance, in
a number of empirical studies, Cohen and Morrison (2004) present evidence of
positive spatial spillovers of public infrastructure between US-states. By con-
trast, Boarnet (1998) and López-Bazo (2003) nd evidence of public infrastruc-
1Recent surveys on tax competition include Zodrow (2010) and Baskaran and Lopes da
Fonseca (2013). The debate on tax competition also often features in the economic press (see,
for instance, Heard that countries should .compete.on tax? Wrong, The Guardian, 18 April
2013).
2An important determinant of multinationalsresponsiveness to a particular locations fall
in tax rate depends on the market potential of that location (see Davies and Voget (2009)). The
higher the locations market potential, the more likely it is that multinationals will respond
by locating there.
3Among many others, Pieretti and Zanaj (2011) use a similar interpretation.
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tural investment having harmful e¤ects on surrounding regions for Canada and
Spain, respectively. Yu et al. (2012) present evidence for China, suggesting
that public infrastructure spillovers are positive between some regions, nega-
tive between others and zero for yet other regions. In our theoretical set-up,
we allow for both positive and negative interregional spillovers from a regions
investment in public infrastructure.
In our model, two jurisdictions, Home and Foreign, choose public in-
frastructure independently and also have prot tax raising power. Each regions
prot tax base depends negatively on local tax rates, but positively on local pub-
lic infrastructure. Jurisdictions play a two-stage game: they commit to public
infrastructure levels in stage one, which captures the long-term nature of this
investment decision, and compete for FDI with corporate taxes in stage two.
Importantly, we incorporate the possible existence of interregional externalities
associated with public infrastructure investment. Public infrastructural invest-
ment in one country may directly reduce the FDI going to the other location,
as it potentially makes the rival location relatively less attractive (e.g., public
investment in domestic roads). However, when investment in public infrastruc-
ture has a positive interregional spillover e¤ect (e.g., investment in interregional
transport routes), FDI to both locations may increase.4 We examine how these
interregional or international spillovers a¤ect the tax competition game between
the jurisdictions. Subsequently, we examine how tax harmonisation, in particu-
lar tax cooperation, a¤ects governmentsoptimal choice of public infrastructure.
We then explore the welfare e¤ects of tax harmonisation and show that, under
some conditions, its e¤ects on the welfare of the countries that take part can be
negative, even if the countries involved are symmetric.
Our results have important policy implications. First, even if tax rates are
chosen cooperatively and the countries involved are similar, a welfare improve-
ment is not guaranteed. Second, if investment in public infrastructure is chosen
by individual countries, one can expect excessive public infrastructure invest-
ment, which may reduce welfare below the level reached under tax competition
if cross-border externalities generated by public infrastructure investment are
su¢ ciently negative. The main reason why public infrastructure investment
may have a negative external e¤ect on other regions is due to a competition
e¤ect that reduces the multinational investment into the other region and thus
harming that regions tax base. So, in a federal context, if the federal gov-
ernment aims to eliminate a race to the bottom in tax rates between its states
by setting a common tax rate at the federal level, it may inadvertently lower
national welfare if its states have autonomous decision power on regional pub-
lic infrastructure investment and use it to attract multinationals from abroad.
Similarly, in a trading block, such as the European Union, tax cooperation at
EU-level may, in the presence of negative cross-border externalities from pub-
lic infrastructure, lead to a drop in welfare when individual member states use
4Martin and Rogers (1995) distinguish between a countrys investment in domestic and
international infrastructure in a theoretical model that examines rm location and integra-
tion (without tax competition) and emphasise the di¤erent e¤ects of the two types of public
infrastructure for agglomeration.
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public infrastructure investment as a means to attract FDI from outside the
EU.
The relationship between public infrastructure and tax competition has
been previously addressed in the literature. Notable examples are Baldwin
et al (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Zissimos and Wooders (2008) and
Pieretti and Zanaj (2011). The last two papers examine the link between public
infrastructure and tax competition in a two-stage game in a Hotelling set-up.
Our paper di¤ers from previous work in three important ways. First, our model
setup is more general than a Hotelling framework and for many of our results
we are able to dispense with specic functional forms. Second, focussing on
the possible externalities associated with public infrastructure investment, we
allow for the possibility of positive as well as negative interregional spillovers.
Third, we examine a form of tax harmonisation that should not just eliminate
the harmful race-to-the-bottom property but allows similar countries to set their
taxes to maximise joint welfare.
Section 2 presents the building blocks of our framework. In section 3, we
solve a simple model that captures the essence of our results. In section 4 we
abandon the specic functional forms used in section 3 to generalise our results
and formalise them in propositions. In section 5 we discuss the welfare e¤ects
of tax harmonisation. Section 6 presents some extensions. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model Set-up
Consider two jurisdictions, Homeand Foreign(denoted by H and F, respec-
tively), which are both prospective host locations for multinational rms from
other countries. The jurisdictions can be di¤erent countries or di¤erent regions
of the same country with independent tax raising authority as well as public
infrastructure decision making power. The jurisdictions compete for third-
country FDI as this generates benets for each region. One obvious benet is
the tax revenue the government collects from multinationals. Naturally, these
tax revenues increase in the actual amount of FDI attracted into the country.
Low corporate tax rates and high investment levels in local public infrastructure
are two ways of achieving this. Tax revenues from multinationals located in H
are represented by tB, where t is Hs prot tax rate and B denotes the aggregate
pre-tax prots of multinational rms located in H. For brevity, we will refer
to B as Hs (multinational) tax base and B as Fs (multinational) tax base.
These mobile tax base functions can be written as:
B = B(t; t; x; x); (1a)
and
B = B(t; t; x; x): (1b)
We assume Bt < 0, where subscripts here and elsewhere denote partial
derivatives. This captures the idea that a higher tax rate reduces the tax base
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as it reduces the inward FDI into H. We have Bt > 0 because the countries are
substitute locations for multinational investment. The partial derivatives of B
are analogous. Local infrastructure can be expected to both make a location
more attractive for multinational investment and to raise the protability at
that location. Both of these e¤ects work towards raising the aggregate pre-tax
prots of multinationals in the region that invests in public infrastructure, hence
Bx > 0 andBx > 0. Signing the cross e¤ectsBx andB

x is less straightforward
as they depend on whether the externality that one regions public infrastructure
investment generates for the other is negative or positive. A rival host regions
investment in public infrastructure may reduce a regions relative attractiveness
to multinationals and therefore its multinational tax base. This could, for
instance, be the case when the rival host location invests in education. However,
some types of public infrastructure investment could be benecial to regions
other than the investing region itself. For example, a regions investment in
a major local port may increase the attractiveness of other nearby prospective
host regions as well. In that case, the investment in public infrastructure by
one region entails a positive interregional spillover to the nearby region. We
dene the ratios (t; t; x; x)  BxBx and 
(t; t; x; x)  BxB
x
;  > 0 implies
that the spillover is positive (Bx > 0), while  < 0 indicates the spillover is
negative (Bx < 0).
5 We assume  1    1 and  1    1, which implies
that the e¤ect of a regions infrastructural investment is always stronger on the
own region than its e¤ect  whether positive or negative  on the competing
region.
Of course, FDI can provide many di¤erent benets to a region. However,
for now, to avoid the analysis becoming unnecessarily complicated, we will just
focus on the gains in tax revenue.6 Welfare for H and F, respectively, are given
by:
W (t; t; x; x) = tB   
(x) (2a)
and
W (t; t; x; x) = tB   
(x) (2b)
where 
(x) and 
(x) stand for the costs of infrastructural investment in H
and F respectively. We assume these are increasing convex functions of public
infrastructure (
00(x) > 0 and (
00(x) > 0).
We will consider two two-stage games. In one game, jurisdictions choose
taxes non-cooperatively; in the other, they set tax rates cooperatively. In the
rst stage of each game, governments simultaneously choose investment levels in
public infrastructure and subsequently, in the second stage, they set corporate
tax rates. We solve each game by backward induction.
We rst solve a specic case of our model, using a linear function for each
regions multinational tax base and a quadratic function for the regional cost
of public infrastructure investment. The use of these special functional forms
allows us to side-step the technicalities involved in solving the general model
5Naturally, it is possible that Bx < 0 while Bx  0 and vice versa.
6 In section 6, we extend the analysis to take account of other, non-tax benets.
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and thus present our results in as transparent a way as possible. We will refer
to this case as the "Linear Quadratic" (LQ) case. Subsequently, we generalise
the model and formulate our results in propositions.
3 The "Linear-Quadratic" case
In the Linear-Quadratic case, the multinational tax bases in H and F are re-
spectively given by:
B =   (t  "t) + (x+ x) (3a)
and
B =   (t   "t) + (x + x) (3b)
In expressions (3a) and (3b), ,  and  are positive, 0 < " < 1 and  1 <  < 1,
so that the sign of the partial derivatives of B and B are as discussed in the
previous section. The respective public infrastructure investment cost functions
for H and F are respectively given by 
(x) = (!=2)x2 and 
(x) = (!=2)x2,
with ! > 0. As indicated by our expressions, we assume for now that the two
regions are completely symmetric.7
3.1 Tax competition
First consider the game in which taxes are set non-cooperatively.
3.1.1 Stage two: Non-cooperative tax setting
The governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose taxes given in-
frastructural investment levels x and x. The Home government maximises
Home welfare with respect to t, which yields its tax reaction function,  (t;x; x):
 (t;x; x) =
+ (x+ x)
2
+
"
2
t (4)
The tax reaction function for the Foreign government is analogous. From ex-
pression (4) we can see that taxes are strategic complements. The tax reactions
shift outward in the regions own public infrastructure investment and in the
competing regions public infrastructure investment if the latter generates a
positive externality.
The equilibrium tax rate for Home, denoted by tN , is:
tN = [(2 + ")+ ((2 + ")x+ (2+ ")x)]=[(4  "2)] (5)
Given symmetry, the equilibrium tax rate in Foreign, tN , takes the same form
with the role of x and x reversed.
7We examine the e¤ect of asymmetry between the regions in section 6.
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Let us now examine how investment in public infrastructure a¤ects equilib-
rium tax rates. A regions tax rate is always increasing in its own investment
in public infrastructure (dtN=dx > 0 from expression (5)). The e¤ect of a re-
gions investment in public infrastructure on the other host regions corporate
tax rate (dtN=dx) is ambiguous and depends on the externality on the rival
region. When a regions infrastructure investment generates a positive or not
too negative externality for the rival host region (i.e.,  >    "=2), it raises
the latters tax rate, but the opposite is true when the negative externality is
negative and su¢ ciently strong (i.e.,  <    "=2).
3.1.2 Stage one: Investment in public infrastructure under tax com-
petition
We now determine optimal regional investment levels in infrastructure. For ease
of exposition, we focus on Hs choice. Fs choice of investment is completely
analogous. Home maximises welfare with respect to x, taking tN = tN (x; x)
(see expression (5)) and tN = tN (x; x) into account. This yields the rst-
order condition for x:
dW
dx
=Wx +Wt
dt
dx
+Wt
dt
dx
= 0 (6)
Here and henceforth we use subscripts to indicate partial derivates. Using the
envelope theorem, Wt = 0 from the second stage. When discussing expression
(6), it proves helpful to use the "strategic investment" terminology pioneered by
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). The rst term in expression (6) is the direct e¤ect
of x on Home welfare, with Wx = t   !x. Let us focus on this term rst. If
governments were to choose public infrastructure investment simultaneously to
setting taxes, H would choose x such that Wx = 0, implying that the marginal
direct benets of public infrastructure investment would be equal to its marginal
costs (i.e., t = !x). We will henceforth refer to this hypothetical case, in which
Wx = 0, as the non-strategic simultaneous-move benchmark. The last term in
expression (6) is the strategicterm (Wt dt

dx ). The sign of this term determines
whether the Home government will  in the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984)  over- or under-invest, relative to the hypothetical non-strategic
benchmark, in order to manipulate the tax rates set in the rival jurisdiction.
If the strategic term is positive, then the rst term in expression (6) has to be
negative (Wx < 0) and we say that the Home government over-invest in public
infrastructure relative to the non-strategic benchmark. If the strategic term is
negative, then the opposite holds (Wx > 0) and the government under-invest
relative to the non-strategic benchmark.
To determine which of these cases will occur, we need to examine the strate-
gic term in detail. The term can be decomposed into Wt and dt=dx. We
have Wt = t" > 0, implying that the Foreign tax rate is friendly, which
means that a rise in Foreigns tax rate increases Home welfare.8 The sign of
8Brander (1995) was the rst to refer to cross derivatives such as this as the "friendliness"
term.
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the strategic term therefore depends on the sign of dt=dx, which, as shown
earlier, depends on the sign of 2+ ". So, if  is above the threshold  =  "=2
(dt=dx > 0), then Home will over-invest in public infrastructure (Wt dt

dx > 0,
hence Wx < 0). However, when  <  =  "=2, it will under-invest
(Wt dt

dx < 0, hence Wx > 0). Again, the rst-order condition for the For-
eign government is analogous to the one for Home given by expression (6), and
the characterisation of Foreigns optimal investment in public infrastructure is
similar to the one given for the Home government.
Intuitively, governments wish to avoid a race to the bottom in corporate tax
rates and will act strategically when choosing their investment levels in public
infrastructure. When a regions investment in public infrastructure raises the
rival regions tax rate, it will choose to augment its investment, since a high tax
rate in the rival host region will allow the investing region to set a high tax rate
itself. When its investment does the opposite, the investing region will avoid
low tax rates by limiting its investment in public infrastructure.
The equilibrium level of public infrastructure investment in H is:
xN = [2(2 + ")]=DN (7)
with DN  (2   ")  4  "2!   22(1 + )(2 + ") > 0. Again, the optimal
public infrastructure investment in Foreign is analogous.
3.2 Tax cooperation
Here, we continue to assume that the regions independently choose their public
infrastructure investment levels, x and x, in stage one, before the common tax
rate,  , is set in stage two. The expressions for the multinational tax base in
Home is now given by:
B =   (1  ") + (x+ x) (8)
and, again, given symmetry, the multinational tax base in Foreign, B, takes the
same form with the role of x and x reversed. The common tax rate is chosen
to maximise the sum of Home and Foreign welfare, W +W , taking account of
the fact that, at this stage, public infrastructure has already been chosen. The
rst-order condition for the jointly optimal tax rate is:
W +W

 =  (B +B

 ) +B +B
 = 0 (9)
implying that the common tax rate under tax cooperation is given by:
 =
2+ (1 + )(x+ x)
4(1  ") (10)
Investment in public infrastructure in either region raises the common tax
rate (d=dx = d=dx = (1 + )=[4(1  ")] > 0).
In stage one, Home and Foreign choose their public infrastructure invest-
ment levels non-cooperatively, taking account of the e¤ect of this on the future
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cooperatively set corporate tax. The rst-order condition for Home welfare
maximisation with respect to infrastructural investment is:
Wx +W
d
dx
= 0: (11)
with Wx =    !x and W = B   (1   ") . The rst-order condition for
Foreign welfare maximisation is similar. Since d=dx = d=dx > 0, the sign
of the strategic term in expression (11) depends on the friendliness term, W .
Since expression (9) can, given symmetry, be rewritten asW +W  = 2W = 0,
it implies W = 0. This means that the strategic term in expressions (11)
vanishes and hence neither region invests strategically: they both invest the
same level of public infrastructure as in the hypothetical benchmark. Optimal
public infrastructure investment levels under tax cooperation (denoted by xC
and xC), are then given by:
xC = xC = =DC (12)
with DC = 2!(1  ")  2(1 + ) > 0 to guarantee stability.
We now depict the rst-order conditions for infrastructure and taxes in sym-
metric (x,t)-space; these are drawn for tax competition (xN (t) and t(x)) and for
tax cooperation (xC() and (x)) (see Figure 1). In both Figure 1a and 1b, the
equilibrium under tax competition is indicated by point N and the equilibrium
under tax cooperation by point C. Figure 1a shows the two equilibria for  > ,
while Figure 1b represents the two equilibria when  < .
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Before discussing the welfare e¤ects of tax cooperation, we will generalise
the model in the next section and formulate our results in propositions.
4 The general model
In this section we generalise our results obtained for the LQ case. For this
purpose, we use the general function forms specied in section 2. Note that we
do no impose symmetry. We do, however, rule out corner solutions.
4.1 Tax competition
Again, we rst consider the game in which taxes are set non-cooperatively.
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4.1.1 Stage two: Non-cooperative tax setting
In stage two, governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose taxes
given infrastructural investment levels x and x. First-order conditions associ-
ated with welfare maximisation yield Hs and Fs tax reaction functions, given
by t =  (t;x; x) and t =  (t;x; x), respectively. The slope of Hs tax
best response functions is given by  t =  Wtt=Wtt. The second-order con-
ditions require Wtt < 0. Hence, the sign of  t is the same as that of Wtt ,
with Wtt = Bt + tBtt . The term Bt is positive. The intuition is that an
increase in the tax in F makes H a relatively more attractive location and, since
this increases Homes tax base, it raises the marginal benet of the tax. The
sign of Btt is ambiguous. However, provided that Btt is not too negative,
we have Wtt > 0. Although it is straightforward to extend the analysis to
cases in which Wtt < 0 and W tt < 0, we henceforth assume that the following
condition holds to avoid excessive taxonomy:
Assumption 1 Wtt > 0 and W tt > 0.
This implies that the tax best-response functions are positively sloped and
that corporate tax rates are strategic complements. The following assumption
ensures that these cross e¤ects do not dominate the direct e¤ects and thus
guarantees the stability of the tax game:
Assumption 2 Wtt +Wtt < 0 and W tt +W

tt < 0.
Investment a¤ects the equilibrium taxes by shifting the tax reaction func-
tions. The impact on Hs reaction function is captured by  x =  Wtx=Wtt
(with Wtx = Bx + tBtx) and, similarly,  x =  Wtx=Wtt (with Wtx =
Bx + tBtx). Since Wt = B + tBt = 0 and hence t =  B=Bt, we can rewrite
Wtx and Wtx as Wtx = Bx   Btx(B=Bt) and Wtx = Bx   Btx(B=Bt).
Dening R  1  (B=Bt)(Btx=Bx) and r  1  (B=Bt)(Btx=Bx), we can write
Wtx = RBx and Wtx = rBx . Let R and r be analogously dened for the
Foreign jurisdiction. We will assume the following reasonable restriction holds:
Assumption 3 R > 0, r > 0, R > 0 and r > 0.9
This condition is guaranteed to hold in many special cases including the LQ
case discussed in the previous subsection. From Assumption 3  x > 0; but the
sign of  x depends on that of Bx and so is ambiguous. However, we also,
9R > 0 implies that the tax elasticity of the regions multinational tax base ( Bt(t=B))
is decreasing in public infrastructure investment; that is  @(Btt=B)=@x = tBtBxR=B2 < 0.
The idea here is that inows of FDI become less sensitive to corporate taxes when the region
is more attractive due to higher infrastructural provision. This implies R > 0 since Bt < 0
and Bx > 0. Likewise, r > 0 implies the elasticity of the Hs multinational tax base does not
decrease if Fs investment tends to reduce the gross pre-tax prots in H. The assumption
implies that if Fs investment makes Hs location less attractive on infrastructural grounds
then Hs multinational tax base becomes more sensitive to taxes.
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assume that the absolute impact of own investment on the tax reaction function
is at least as large as the impact of rival investment on the reaction function so
that:
Assumption 4 j xj  j xj.
Equilibrium tax rates depend on the levels of public infrastructure govern-
ments invested in period one and can be written as t = t(x; x) and t =
t(x; x).
Assumption 5 For given infrastructural investment levels, the tax equilib-
rium ft(x; x); t(x; x)g; is unique.
Note that Assumptions 1 to 5 hold automatically in the LQ version of the
model.
To determine the e¤ect of x on equilibrium tax rates, we totally di¤erentiate
the rst-order conditions for welfare maximisations and obtain:
dt
dx
=
W txWtt  W ttWtx

(13a)
and
dt
dx
=
WtxW

tt  WttW tx

(13b)
with  WttW tt  W ttWtt > 0, which follows from Assumption 2.
Proposition 1 Under non-cooperative tax setting an increase in public invest-
ment increases the optimal tax in the investing country.
Proof: See Appendix.
Using the expressions for Wtx;Wtx W tx and W

tx we can rewrite expres-
sions (13b) and the analogous expression dt=dx as:
dt
dx
= A(  ) (14a)
and
dt
dx
= A(   ) (14b)
with A   rBxWtt= > 0, A   rBxW tt= > 0,   W

ttR
Wttr
< 0 and


= WttR

W
ttr
< 0. This gives us the following result.
Proposition 2 Under non-cooperative tax setting,
(a) an increase in public investment in Home increases (decreases) the optimal
tax in the Foreign country if  >  ( < );
(b) an increase in public investment in Foreign increases (decreases) the optimal
tax in Home if  > 

( < 

).
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If the Home regions investment in public infrastructure raises the multina-
tional tax base in the other host region (i.e., Bx > 0), dt
=dx > 0 is guaranteed
(from expression (14a)): a regions investment in public infrastructure increases
the other host regions corporate tax rate.
However, if Bx < 0 (and hence  < 0), the sign of dt
=dx is ambiguous
(see expression (14a)). If Hs investment in public infrastructure only causes a
modestreduction in the multinational tax base in F (i.e.,  < 0 but jj < ),
Homes investment will raise Foreigns corporate tax rate. But, if Hs investment
in public infrastructure generates a dramatic reduction in multinational tax
base in F (i.e.,  < 0 with jj > ), Homes investment will reduce Foreigns
corporate tax rate (dt=dx < 0).10
4.1.2 Stage one: Investment in public infrastructure under tax com-
petition
We now determine the regionsoptimal investment in infrastructure. For ease
of exposition we will focus on Hs choice. Fs choice of investment is completely
analogous. The rst-order condition for Home welfare maximisation is given by
expression (6) with Wt = 0 from the second stage. The rst term in expression
(6), the direct e¤ect of x on Home welfare, is now equal to Wx = tBx 
0. The
sign of the strategic term, the last term in expression (6), determines whether
the Home government will over- or under-invest relative to the hypothetical
non-strategic benchmark, in order to manipulate the tax rates set in the rival
jurisdiction.
Proposition 3 Under non-cooperative tax setting, Home government will
(a) strategically overinvest in public infrastructure relative to the non-strategic
benchmark benchmark if  > ;
(b) strategically underinvest in public infrastructure relative to the non-strategic
benchmark benchmark if  < .
Proof: To determine which of these cases will occur, we need to examine
the strategic term in detail. The term can be decomposed intoWt and dt=dx.
We haveWt = tBt > 0, implying that the Foreign tax rate is friendly, which
means that a rise in Foreigns tax rate increases Home welfare. The sign of the
strategic term therefore depends on the sign of dt=dx, which, as Proposition 2
showed, depends on the sign of   .
4.2 Tax cooperation
In this subsection we restrict attention to symmetric regions.
10The thresholds  and 

are negative but they need not always be greater than  1. If they
are not larger than  1, then there is no  and  values for which taxes fall in rival investment.
However, if the B and B functions are additively separable in taxes and infrastructure, then
R = R = r = r = 1 and then  >  1 and  >  1 follow from Assumption 2.
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Assumption 6 The regions are identical: they have symmetric tax base
functions and identical public infrastructure cost functions.
This assumption will facilitate comparison with the rst best, which we will
discuss in the next section. The rst-order condition for the jointly optimal tax
is given by expression (9), with
W =W

 in a symmetric equilibrium and so 2W = 0 (from expression (9)),
implying W = 0. To compare the harmonised and non-harmonised taxes note
that W = 0 can be written as Wt +Wt = 0. Since Wt > 0, this implies
Wt < 0, meaning that, at given (symmetric) public infrastructure investment
levels, the cooperative taxes are higher than those under non-cooperation.
In stage one, the Home jurisdiction chooses its public infrastructural in-
vestment non-cooperatively, for which the rst-order condition is given by ex-
pression (11). Since the equilibrium in public infrastructure is symmetric,
W +W

 = 2W = 0. In turn, this implies Wx = 0 (from expression (11)) and,
as discussed in the previous section, this means that investment is set according
to the non-strategic simultaneous-move benchmark.
Proposition 4 When countries are symmetric, tax cooperation eliminates strate-
gic investment in public infrastructure.
5 Tax competition versus tax cooperation: A
welfare comparison
In this section, we compare welfare levels under tax competition and tax coop-
eration. It is a priori not certain that cooperative tax setting alone will yield
higher welfare levels than tax competition since, even under tax cooperation,
jurisdictions set their infrastructure independently. First, we prove that tax
cooperation typically does not yield the "rst-best" outcome, where the "rst-
best" refers to the jointly optimal outcome in which the regions set both taxes
and infrastructure levels to maximise their total welfare. Second, we argue that
tax cooperation may not even be the second-best and determine the conditions
under which tax competition actually yields an outcome that is welfare superior
to the outcome under tax cooperation.
5.1 The rst best
The rst-best outcome is reached when a social planner, maximising joint welfare
of Home and Foreign, decides on the tax rate and each regions investment
in public infrastructure.11 This outcome is replicated by the regions jointly
setting both the tax rate and public infrastructure levels to maximise their
total welfare. Assuming that the optimisation problem has a unique interior
11Clearly, this is not the full global rst-best as it ignores among other things the welfare
of the FDI source countries.
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solution, the rst-order condition for the rst-best tax is given by expression
(9), whereas the optimal choice of infrastructure is given by:
Wx +W

x = 0 (15)
where Wx = Bx   
0 and W x = Bx.The following proposition does not rely
on special functional forms.
Proposition 5 The cooperative tax outcome coincides with the rst-best joint
optimum only when  = 0.
Proof. At  = 0, W x = 0, which implies that expression (15) is reduced to
Wx = 0. In addition, the rst-order condition for the rst-best tax is given by
expression (9). Hence, at  = 0, both rst-order conditions for the rst best
are identical to those for the case with tax cooperation alone
At the rst-best, unlike at the cooperative harmonised tax equilibrium, each
regions public infrastructural investment is chosen taking full account of the
external e¤ect on the other regions welfare. Hence, tax cooperation alone will
not yield the rst-best outcome when regional public infrastructure investment
generates cross-regional externalities.
5.2 Tax competition versus tax cooperation
After having demonstrated that tax cooperation alone typically does not yield
the rst-best outcome, we now show that tax cooperation may even yield a
lower welfare level than tax competition when regional public infrastructure
investment generate externalities for the other potential host region. Since
a welfare comparison between tax cooperation and tax competition requires
specic functional forms, we use the LQ version of our model.
In Figures 2a-c, we again depict the rst-order conditions for infrastructure
and taxes in symmetric (x,t)-space; these are now not only shown for tax com-
petition (xN (t) and t(x)) and for tax cooperation (xC() and (x)), but also
for the rst-best (xO() and (x)), where the rst-best outcome is represented
by point O. In Figure 2a, there is no externality from public infrastructure
investment ( = 0). In that case  as shown by Proposition 5 , tax coopera-
tion actually yields the rst-best outcome and hence the rst-best welfare level,
whereas tax competition clearly attains a lower welfare level (represented by
the fact that it lies on the WN -isowelfare contour, with WN < WO). When
there is a spillover  positive or negative , welfare under tax cooperation always
falls below the rst-best welfare level. Nevertheless, for positive externalities
( > 0), tax cooperation always yields a higher welfare level than tax competi-
tion, which is illustrated in Figure 2b (WC > WN ). However, this is not always
the case when the externality is negative ( < 0). Why is this so? With tax
cooperation equilibrium tax rates are higher than with tax competition. This
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implies that levels of public infrastructure investment are higher with tax co-
operation than with competition. However, with each jurisdiction investing in
public infrastructure that is harmful to the other host jurisdiction, the exter-
nality will lower welfare in each jurisdiction. Furthermore, when investment
in public infrastructure is relatively e¤ective (i.e., when  is high), investment
under tax cooperation will be a lot higher than with tax competition, thereby
magnifying the negative welfare e¤ect of public infrastructure investment on
each jurisdiction.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Next, we consecutively calculate welfare levels under tax competition and
tax cooperation in order to determine the conditions under which welfare under
tax competition is higher than under tax cooperation.
Under tax competition, the rst-order condition for welfare maximisation
Wt = B + tBt = 0 implies B =  tBt = tN . Also, since Wx = t   !x,
Wt = t" and dt=dx = (2 + ") in expression (6), we can write xN =
(=)[1 + 2" ( )4 "2 ]t
N , where   2=! is a measure of the relative e¤ectiveness
of public infrastructure investment. Hence, each regions welfare level under
tax competition is given by:
WN = [1  
2
(1 + 2"
(  )
4  "2 )
2](tN )2 =W N (16)
with tN = tN = 
(2 ") (1+)(1+2"  
4 "2 )
.
With tax cooperation and symmetric jurisdictions, expression (9) implies
2W = 0, hence B =  B = (1   ") . Furthermore, Wx =    !x and
d=dx = (1 + )=[4(1   ")] from expression (10). Hence, welfare in each
jurisdiction under tax coperation is equal to:
WC = [(1  ")  
2
]2 =W C (17)
with  = =[2(1  ")  (1 + )].
Even in the LQ case, the welfare expressions (expressions 16 and 17) are not
easy to compare. It is helpful to illustrate the welfare comparison diagram-
matically. We use two gures to do this. Figure 3a depicts welfare under tax
competition and tax cooperation (as well as in the rst best) as functions of .
In the diagram, when  is su¢ ciently negative, welfare under tax competition
is higher than under tax cooperation. Obviously, this diagram is drawn for
specic parameter values. While it is true that when externalities from public
infrastructure are positive, tax cooperation always yields higher welfare than tax
competition, tax cooperation does not necessarily give lower welfare than tax
competition when externalitities are negative. In fact, it is also necessary that,
at the same time as the externality being negative, the relative e¤ectiveness
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of public infrastructure () is high. Figure 3b demonstrates this by showing
welfare under the three regimes (tax competition, tax cooperation and the rst
best) as a function of ; note that in this gure  < 0). At the thresholde, welfare under tax competition and cooperation are equal. For low levels
of  ( < e), tax cooperation generates higher welfare than tax competition.
However, for -levels beyond e ( > e), the welfare level attained under tax
competition is higher than under tax cooperation.
Proposition 6 In the LQ-case, there exists a critical -threshold, e(), with
(i) WC(e) =WN (e) and (ii) de=d > 0.
Proof See Appendix.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
6 Extensions
In this section we look briey at some extensions of our basic model. We con-
sider, in turn, a modied welfare function that includes non-tax benets of FDI,
regional asymmetries, and another form of tax harmonisation, i.e., a minimum
tax.
6.1 Non-tax revenue benets of inward FDI and public
infrastructure
To keep the analysis simple, we have assumed so far that the only benet of
public infrastructure is that it enhances the multinational prot tax base. How-
ever, public infrastructure clearly has many di¤erent direct social and economic
benets. So does inward FDI: it also may generate benets in addition to in-
creasing the multinational tax base, such as providing technological spillovers
to domestic rms. Furthermore, there may be benecial interaction e¤ects
between public infrastructure and FDI; for instance, a more developed pub-
lic infrastructure may allow a country to benet to a greater extent from any
spillovers from inward FDI. In this subsection we will extend our analysis to take
account of these additional benets. We will represent these additional benets
to Home and Foreign by g and g, respectively, and assume that g is increasing
in both Home infrastructure, x, and inward FDI, denoted by k. Furthermore,
as argued earlier, inward FDI is decreasing in t and increasing in t and x.
The volume of FDI may also depend on x, though as discussed earlier,
the sign is ambiguous. Taking all these e¤ects into account we can write the
non-tax benets of inward FDI and public infrastructure in compact form as
G(t; t; x; x) = g[k(t; t; x; x); x] and G(t; t; x; x) = g[k(t; t; x; x); x] for
Home and Foreign respectively. The partial derivatives of G(t; t; x; x) are
Gt < 0, Gt > 0, Gx > 0 and Gx ambiguous where here and henceforth we use
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subscripts to indicate partial derivates. The partial derivatives of G(t; t; x; x)
are analogous. Home and Foreign welfare can now be written as:
W (t; t; x; x) = tB(t; t; x; x) +G(t; t; x; x)  
(x) (18a)
and
W (t; t; x; x) = tB(t; t; x; x) +G(t; t; x; x)  
(x) (18b)
Compared to the case without G and and G, it remains the case that welfare
can written as a function of the taxes and infrastructure in the two countries.
So, apart from complicating the analysis, what di¤erence does the inclusion
of G and G make? First, additional benets to FDI clearly work towards
reducing the optimal corporate tax rates. The rst-order condition for the
Home tax is now tBt +B +Gt = 0. Hence, the optimal tax can be written as
t =  (B=Bt)   (Gt=Bt) where the new second term on the right-hand side is
negative and works towards a lower tax.
Second, there is a more subtle e¤ect on the strategic incentive to invest in
public infrastructure. When additional benets of FDI and public infrastruc-
ture are taken into account, investment in infrastructure could in some cases
shift a regions tax reaction function inwards rather than outwards. Since taxes
are strategic complements such an inward shift in the reaction function will
typically lead to both taxes falling. If the presence of G and G does have
this e¤ect, it will change the strategic incentive to invest in infrastructure. As
we saw earlier, the impact on Hs reaction function of an increase is captured
by  x =  Wtx=Wtt with Wtt < 0: Hence the sign of  x depends on that of
Wtx = Bx + tBtx + Gtx: Without Gtx, this is positive and it will remain so
provided Gtx is not too negative. In that case, our analysis of the strategic
e¤ect of public infrastructure is qualitatively una¤ected.
However, Assumption 3 does not guarantee that Wtx = Bx + tBtx +Gtx is
positive and a negative e¤ect Gtx works towards  x being negative. When
would Gtx be negative? Suppose public infrastructure increases the marginal
return to FDI. For instance, a country with a more developed education system
may have a greater capacity to absorb and make productive use of spillovers from
foreign multinationals. Algebraically, in the case of the Home country, this can
be captured by gkx > 0. Such an "absorptive capacity" e¤ect works towards
Gtx and  x being negative. To see this as clearly as possible, consider the case
in which infrastructure only a¤ects g(k; x) directly but does not directly a¤ect
the level of FDI so that k(t; t) is independent of x. In this case, Gtx = gkxkt.
Then, Gtx has the opposite sign to gkx: Intuitively, if public infrastructure
increases the marginal return to FDI then it is more likely that a higher x leads
a country to set a lower corporate tax to encourge now more benecial FDI.
If this is the case, then  x < 0 and, since taxes are strategic complements,
an increase in Home infrastructure works towards a reduction in both taxes,
provided  x is not too positive.
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6.2 Asymmetric regions
So far, we assumed the regions involved are symmetric. In this subsection we
discuss the e¤ects of tax cooperation when regions are asymmetric. Again,
as a welfare comparison between tax cooperation and tax competition requires
specic functional forms, we use the LQ version of our model.
The multinational tax base functions for Home and Foreign are respectively
given by expression (3a) and by:
B =    (t   "t) + (x + x) (19)
Thus, we introduce regional asymmetry in the most straightforward way, i.e.,
by assuming that one of the regions, Home, has, ceteris paribus, a higher multi-
national tax base than Foreign, which is captured by  > . The reasons
why this might be the case could be varied and have a historical, geographi-
cal, cultural or even a linguistic basis. Henceforth, we will refer to Home as
the "naturally more attractive" region for short. In the equilibrium with tax
competition, Home will now charge a higher tax rate than Foreign, while also
investing more in public infrastructure. When the regions cooperate and set a
common tax rate,  , the expression for Foreigns multinational tax base is given
by:
B =    (1  ") + (x + x) (20)
while Homes tax base is given by expression (8). The common (harmonised)
tax rate is chosen to maximise the sum of Home and Foreign welfare, W +W .
However, the rst-order condition for the jointly optimal tax rate,W+W  = 0,
now implies W =  W  , implying that the strategic term in expressions (11)
and the strategic term in the analogous expression for Foreign will have opposite
signs. This, in turn, means that, if one region strategically over-invests relative
to the non-strategic hypothetical benchmark, then the other one strategically
under-invests. In fact, Home, the "naturally more attractive" region will over-
invest in public infrastructure, thus attempting to drive up the tax rate, whereas
Foreign will under-invest, thereby attempting to keep the common tax rate low.
We now discuss the welfare e¤ects of tax cooperation, using a diagrammatic
approach. (The derivations have been relegated to Appendix B.) Figure 4
shows welfare for each country as a function of , where the dashed curves
indicate welfare under tax competition and the solid curves represent welfare
with tax cooperation (with the starred ones representing Foreign welfare). The
level of  is chosen such that the point at which WN = WC and the point at
which W N = W C can both be depicted in the diagram. Clearly, welfare is
always higher in Home, i.e., the country that is "naturally more attractive" for
FDI; so, WN > W N and WC > W C . Like with symmetric regions, whether
a region gains or loses from tax cooperation depends on the relative e¤ectiveness
of public infrastructure investment and on the level of the spillover. When the
spillover parameter is high ( > ein Figure 4, withW C(e) =W N (e)), both
regions gain from tax cooperation and will agree to harmonise taxes. However,
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when spillovers are su¢ ciently negative ( < e in Figure 4 with WC(e) =
WN (e) ), tax cooperation harms both regions and there will be no incentive to
set taxes cooperatively. For intermediate spillover levels (e <  < e in Figure
4), the "naturally more attractive" region (Home) prefers tax cooperation to tax
competition, while the opposite is true for the "naturally less attractive" region.
This may even occur for small positive values of . In that case, regions may
wish to bargain over side-payments to make tax cooperation sustainable.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
6.3 Other forms of tax harmonisation
We now consider an alternative form of tax harmonisation. Suppose regional
taxes are constrained not to fall below a minimum tax, t. Given t, the juris-
dictions play a non-cooperative two-stage game, setting infrastructure in stage
one and taxes in stage two. We discuss the e¤ect of the minimum tax on public
infrastructure investment, using Figure 5. In Figure 5, tN and tN represent
equilibrium tax rates when governments choose infrastructural investment levels
strategically.
When the minimum tax is su¢ ciently low, i.e., t < tN , it will have no
e¤ect. Each region still has an incentive to push the tax rate beyond the
legal minimum and hence do so by choosing public infrastructure investment
strategically. Equilibrium taxes remain tN and tN and investment levels in
public infrastructure are the same as in the situation before the minimum tax
rate was imposed. This case is depicted in Figure 5a.
However, when the minimum tax rate is higher than the strategically cho-
sen tax rate in the symmetric equilibrium (t > tN ), the equilibrium tax rate in
each region is t. Figure 5b represents this case. There is no longer any need
to choose public infrastructure investment levels strategically as the legally im-
posed minimum tax rate e¤ectively pushes the tax rates beyond the level that
would prevail when governments are unconstrained in choosing taxes. This
implies that when public infrastructure has positive (or not too negative) in-
terregional spillovers (i.e.,  > ), a minimum tax can, if e¤ective, be expected
to curtail investment in public infrastructure (since governments strategically
over-investwhen unconstrained). However, one can expect a minimum tax
again, if e¤ective, to increase investment in public infrastructure when the lat-
ter has su¢ ciently negative interregional spillovers ( < ) or when public
infrastructure purely enhances the regional benets of FDI.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
7 Conclusion
A countrys ability to attract inward FDI and the protability of that investment
depends, among other things, on corporate tax rates and on the level and quality
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of local public infrastructure. Since a potential host country can attract more
multinational rms by increasing its investment in public infrastructure, the
multinational rm component of its tax base thus depends in part on the level
of local public infrastructure. What is more, public infrastructural investment
in one country can also a¤ect the tax base of a competing host country, and
may do so either positively or negatively.
To study these issues we have constructed a two-country model of corporate
tax competition for inward FDI, in which governments also invest in public in-
frastructure. When the externality generated by one countrys investment in
public infrastructure is positive or not too negative, then governments strategi-
cally increase their investment in infrastructure in order to raise the rival host
countrys corporate tax rate. This softens tax competition and therefore ben-
ets the investing host country indirectly. However, if the externality is very
negative so that infrastructure in one country strongly reduces the rival host
countrys tax base through the business stealing e¤ect, then the strategic e¤ect
of public infrastructure is negative and the investing country has an incentive
to lower its public infrastructure investment.
The external e¤ect of public infrastructure on the other country also a¤ects
the gains from tax harmonisation. Although tax cooperation often raises the
welfare of countries, we have found that this is not always the case. In fact,
when infrastructure is su¢ ciently cost e¤ective in raising a countrys own tax
base but at the same time generates a su¢ ciently large negative interregional
externality, then tax cooperation, without infrastructure coordination, actually
reduces welfare.
The reason for this lies in the fact that, although resulting in higher equilib-
rium taxes and hence avoiding a race to the bottom in tax rates, tax cooperation
also leads to higher investment in public infrastructure. When countries coor-
dinate taxes but not infrastructure, they ignore the business stealing negative
externality that their infrastructure imposes on other countries and they en-
gage in excessive (mutually damaging) investment. When this e¤ect is strong
enough, tax cooperation results in lower welfare levels than tax competition.
Our results are cautionary as they imply that policy makers may inadver-
tently make matters worse by signing up to tax harmonisation programmes that
involve cooperation in taxes without consideration of regional public infrastruc-
ture investment schemes. Thus, those assessing tax harmonisation initiatives
at both the national level  in federal states  and at the supranational level
 such as the EU  should take into account the e¤ects on regional public in-
frastructure investment. Since our model has identied negative externalities
in infrastructure as a potential reason for welfare losses from tax harmonisation,
more empirical work in this area would help to guide policymakers.
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8 Appendices
8.1 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1:
Under non-cooperative tax setting an increase in public investment increases
the optimal tax in the investing country. Here we will examine the the case of
the home country.
From dtdx =
WtxWtt WttWtx
 we know that the sign depends on that of
the numerator since  > 0 from Assumption 2. To determine the sign of the
numerator not that the derivative W tt negative from the foreign second-order
condition for foreign country, the derivative Wtt is positive from Assumption 1
and Wtx is positive from Assumption 3. Hence dtdx is guaranteed to be positive
if W tx  0; so we will focus on the case in which W tx < 0 . When W tx < 0;
Assumption 4 which states that j xj  j xj implies  Wtx=Wtt  W tx=W tt
and so Wtx   Wtt W

tx
W
tt
> 0 . Hence the numerator  W ttWtx +W txWtt
is at least as large as Wtt

Wtx
W
tt

W tt +W

txWtt = W

tx(Wtt +Wtt) > 0
from Assumption 2. Hence we can conclude that dtdx =
WtxWtt WttWtx
 > 0:
Analogous derivations can be used to show dt

dx > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
The threshold e is dened by WN (e) =WC(e). Using expressions (16) and
(17), we obtain the following quadratic function in e:
Ae2 + Ze + E = 0 (A.1)
with A   2(1+)[(1 ")(1 )S2 (2 ")S+(1+)], Z  4(1 ")2S2+4(1 
")(1 + )[2  (2  ")S]  (2  ")2, E  2(1  ")"2 and S  1 + 2"  4 "2 . Solving
expression (A.1) for e, selecting the relevant root, yields e =  Z+pZ2 4AE2A > 0.
8.2 Appendix B
We dene   =, hence  < 1. In stage two, equilibrium tax rates with tax
competition are given by
tN = [(2 + ")+ ((2 + ")x+ (2+ ")x)]=[(4  "2)] (B.1a)
for Home and by
tN = [(2+ ")+ ((2 + ")x + (2+ ")x)]=[(4  "2)] (B.1b)
for Foreign. Home and Foreigns public infrastructure best response functions
are:
x = 2(2 + ")[(2 + ")+ 2(  )x]=H (B.2a)
21
and
x = 2(2 + ")[(2+ ")+ 2(  )x]=H (B.2b)
respectively, with H  !2   22(2 + ")2 and H > 0 from the second-order
conditions. Hence, Home and Foreign equilibrium investment levels in public
infrastructure are respectively given by:
xN = [2(2 + ")(H(2 + ") + J(2+ "))]=5N (B.3a)
and
xN = [2(2 + ")(H(2+ ") + J(2 + "))]=5N (B.3b)
with J  42(2 + ")(  ) and 5N  H2   J2.
Under tax cooperation, the common tax rate set cooperatively by the regions
is:
 =
(1 + ) + (1 + )(x+ x)
4(1  ") (B.4)
where equilibrium levels of x and xare given by:
xC =

rC [(3 + )(K + L) + (1  )(K + L)] (B.5a)
and
xC =

rC [(3 + )(K + L) + (1  )(K + L)] (B.5b)
with K  8!(1 ") 2(1+)(3 ), L  2(1+)2 and rC  K2 L2 > 0.
With K > L (to guarantee stability) and  < 1, we indeed have xC > xC .
Furthermore, we know that from expression (11) that Home over-invests in
public infrastructure  relative to the hypothetical non-strategic benchmark 
whenW = B (1 ") > 0. Using expression (B.4), this condition can, after
some rearranging, be rewritten as (1 )x > +x) >  (1 ))+(1 )x.
Since  < 1 and xC > xC , this condition is met; hence, Home strategically over-
invests in public infrastructure, whereas Foreign strategically under-invests.
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Figure 1: Symmetric first-order conditions under tax 
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Figure 2: Tax rates and public infrastructure investment levels 
under symmetry – Tax competition vs. cooperation
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Figure 3: Welfare under tax competition and tax cooperation
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Figure 4: Welfare under tax competition and tax cooperation 
– Asymmetric jurisdictions
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Figure 5: The effect of tax harmonisation – A minimum tax
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